Do We Have a Moral Obligation to Be Grateful?

Why do we say “thank you?” It’s two words we say so often they almost lose their meaning. But if you pause and take a moment to think about those words, you might—as many philosophers would—ask: Do we have a moral obligation to be grateful?

Much of the debate in philosophy surrounding this question has to do with how “moral obligation” is defined. Because some define “obligation” in the stricter, more binding sense, philosophers hardly agree whether we have a moral obligation to be grateful. In other words, philosophers debate if there’s a duty to be grateful to a person who has benefited you. That is, if you don’t carry out that imperative, you are a morally questionable person. 

One of the foundational arguments for the moral obligation to be grateful is the “debt” metaphor. If one subscribes to this argument, then one accepts the fact that they have a moral obligation to be grateful as if one were repaying a debt, which is something that must be done. Eighteenth-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant argued in favor of this argument in line with his broader deontological worldview—the ethical theory that determines the morality of an action based on rules and duties. 

Kant claimed people who failed to fulfill such obligations or duties deserve to be regarded as the moral equivalent of criminals of society. An example: Roman politician Brutus. After Caesar pardoned his past disloyalties and promoted him to high political office, Brutus assassinated Caesar instead of repaying him his “debt” of gratitude. Kant wants us to see that Brutus’ ultimate failure to repay Caesar and fulfill his moral obligation leaves us no choice but to rank Brutus as one of history’s worst and most selfish. 

However, contemporary philosophers like Patrick Fitzgerald and P. F. Camenisch point out the vagueness of this moral obligation talk. Moral this, moral that, it’s not clear as to when and how this moral “debt” should be repaid. Just by asserting that we are obliged to be grateful doesn’t really mean anything if the way by which we should repay it is not specified. Instead, as they argue, acts of gratitude must be done spontaneously, or be from natural inclination and not on purpose. And since moral obligation is only something that we can fulfill when it’s done on purpose, acts of gratitude are logically incompatible with moral obligation. 

Perhaps this disagreement hits on something that we can all take away and bring into our own lives. Treating gratitude as something that must be repaid—a moral obligation—might feel unnatural and too rigid. Yet, we feel there’s still a need to be grateful,perhaps because we are obliged to do so. But to do it right, we must not discard the other side of the coin: Gratitude must be done on one’s own accord. 

We must truly believe that what we are doing is genuine for the act to really count as gratitude. Yes, by understanding or perhaps accepting that we are morally obliged to be grateful might compel one to act, but that act remains a by-product of external reasons based on the notion of duty. When one acts under such a premise, how confident can they say that their acts of gratitude are genuine and not motivated by reasons other than just the belief in the good of the action in and of itself?

Now take a moment to think about why we say “thank you.” There’s much to think about, yes, but don’t overthink. We will still say “thank you” every day. There is no one answer—as is typically the case in philosophy—to these kinds of questions, but now, hopefully, we do so with the recognition that sometimes we might be obliged to be grateful, but also that sometimes real gratitude flows from the heart.